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them. I think it was his idea, first, that of illustrating some of the quaint sentences of Emerson. It should be stated, too, that these and subsequent sketches were not intended as anything more than humorous attempts to put into a literal form on paper some of Emerson's quaint sentences. There was no one else I tried my hand on at that time, and the first things I did in that way were really for the private amusement of Clarke and myself and a few other Emersonians; and there was never any intention that they should be known to the public. I always took pains to repudiate any Philistine idea that anything like ridicule was here attempted." Mr. Clarke's statement is quite in agreement with this. Mr. Cranch adds: "It ought to be stated that, though I preached several years in various parts of the country, I was never ordained or settled as a parish minister; and that, though I have given a good deal of time to literary work, I have endeavored to keep mainly to my profession as a painter." He is about to publish a volume of his later and riper poems, which may appear in the course of the year.

Mr. Curtis claims that there was nothing of romance in his paper in the "Homes of American Authors," and that every incident mentioned was an actual occurrence. He had letters from Emerson and Hawthorne before he wrote his paper, to enable him to verify certain details. Mr. Curtis seems to have been misled, however, in regard to some of the incidents he relates. W. H. Channing was ordained in Cincinnati, May 10, 1839, and was not there much before that time. W. B. Greene entered the Baptist Seminary at Newton, Mass. Stearns Wheeler, as Mr. Lowell informs me, was the companion of Thoreau in a first experiment in camping-out on the borders of Lincoln pond. This was during their senior year in college, and the scene of the experiment was but a few miles from Walden pond.

In regard to his own contributions to "The Dial," Mr. Lowell writes me as follows: "I would gladly help you if I could, but have no memoranda which would help me. I think you have noted all my contributions to 'The Dial.' After forty-five years one has forgotten much, and wishes he had never had so much to forget! Till you reminded me of it I had forgotten that I had written for 'The Dial' at all. The teeth of memory loosen and drop out like those of the jaws."

G. W. C.

BOOK NOTICES.

LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paraissant tous les mois ; dirigée par TH. RIBOT.

JANUARY, 1880 :

The January number of "La Revue Philosophique" for 1880 contains the following articles :

"The Sense of Color ; its Origin and Development," by A. Espinas.

"The sense of color is inspired in birds and insects through their pursuit of flowers,

and from them man has inherited his instinct for color, and in this way the corresponding arts have been produced." The author continues to explain color in the animal and vegetable kingdom and its effect on men and animals, and the reason for their preference for certain hues.

"Contemporary Philosophers—M. Vacherot," by G. Séailles.

The author praises a work by M. Vacherot, regarding it as not only interesting as the history of a free mind, but as part of the logical development of French philosophy in the nineteenth century. "Science," says M. Vacherot, "is reality, and the study of metaphysics is the explanation of reality; the first controls the second, and the second completes the first."

"The Problems of Education," by Emile Boirac.

Notes and Documents:

"Notes on the History of my Parrot in its Relation to the Nature of Language," by Dr. Samuel Wilks, a member of the Royal Society of London. Extract from the "Journal of Medical Science" (Eng.).

According to Dr. Wilks, there is no difference between the vocal apparatus of animals and that of men; the power of language comes from the cerebral organization.

Books examined are:

"The Data of Ethics," by Herbert Spencer. "The Idea of Right in Germany, England, and France," by A. Fouillée. "Error," by V. Brochard. "Monads and Imagination as a Principle of Development of the World," by Froschammer (Fr.). "Principles of the Algebra of Logic, with Examples," by Macfarlane (Eng.).

FEBRUARY, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for February, 1880, contains:

"Sleep and Dreams—III. Their Relation to the Theory of Memory," by J. Delbœuf.

"The Sense of Color; its Origin and Development," by A. Espinas (concluded).

"Contemporary Philosophers—M. Vacherot" (concluded).

Books examined are:

"Metaphysics; its Nature and Laws in its Relations with Religion and Science, to serve as an Introduction to the Metaphysics of Aristotle," by Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire.

Bibliographical Notices.

MARCH, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for March, 1880, contains:

"The Law of Similarity in the Association of Ideas," by V. Brochard. "Two perfectly similar ideas," says the author, "would be only one idea." He compares the mind to a musical instrument in which the keys are in close relation to each other, and explains the degree of similarity of one idea with another.

"The Masters of Kant—III. Kant and J. J. Rousseau," by D. Nolen. M. Nolen compares Kant and Rousseau, who see themselves in nature. Their philosophical ideas and temperaments are studied in their points of contrast in this interesting article.

"Thales and what he has borrowed from Egypt," by P. Tannery. The author gives the progress of philosophy in Thales, and notes what is original and what has been borrowed from Egypt.

Notes and Documents:

"Memory and the Phonograph," by Guyau.

"The Somnambulism of Socrates," by Dr. P. Despine. The author regards the somnambulism of Socrates as a cataleptic state, and not madness or ecstasy.

Books examined are :

"The Evolution of Morality," by Staniland Wake (Eng.). "Scientific Philosophy," by Girard. "Contemporary German Psychology," by Th. Ribot. "Thoughts, Maxims, and Fragments," by Schopenhauer.

Review of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy." "Mind," October, 1879; January, 1880.

APRIL, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for April, 1880, contains : "Synthetic Views on Sociology," by A. Fouillée.

"Sociology," according to this author, "springs from a study which is in a great measure mythical or poetical, and, besides moral and social, the new sociology has metaphysical consequences." The subject is considered minutely under many heads.

"The Development of the Moral Sense in the Child," by B. Perez.

At the age of three or four a child forms regular habits, which are not moral because he has no consciousness of them, and at seven months it is only through the association of ideas that he learns obedience. The author continues his subject by showing the development of the moral sense, external influences, and the effect of voluntary observation in the child.

"Sleep and Dreams," by J. Delbœuf (concluded).

Notes and Documents :

"On the Influence of Movements on the Sensations," by Ch. Richet.

"On the Impossibility of obtaining Knowledge of Geometry through a Simple Condensation of the Results of Experience," by J. Boussinesq.

Books examined are :

"Lectures and Essays," by W. K. Clifford (Eng.); "History of Moral Ideas in Antiquity," by J. Denis, 2d ed. (Fr.); "Superstition in Science," by W. Wundt, taken from "Unsere Zeit." An article by Wundt, says his critic, is always welcomed by the philosophical world, as one is sure to find erudition united to science and good sense.

MAY, 1880 :

"La Revue Philosophique" for May, 1880, contains : "Is the Actual Infinite contradictory?" An answer to M. Renouvier, by H. Lotze.

Wherein M. Renouvier and Lotze differ, according to the latter, is that the former believes the existence of the infinite to be impossible, because we can reach it only by the synthesis of its elements; Lotze believes that, if there is an infinite, it cannot, according to its nature, be exhausted by the addition of its finished parts, and that when the terms of a series are of such a nature that one cannot conceive of them except as succeeding each other, it is impossible for the series to form a finished whole, but it does not prove that a succession is impossible because it is not finished.

"Visual Forms and Æsthetic Pleasure," by J. Sully.

The author regards it as a truth, furnished by experience and deduced from general laws, that the movement of every organ is accompanied by a sensation of pleasure, which he analyzes, and various kinds of movement.

"Memory as a Biological Fact," by Th. Ribot.

M. Ribot offers a scientific analysis of memory, and shows how much it is acquired and how much it is inherited.

Notes and Documents :

"Descartes as a Stoic," by V. Brochard.

Books examined are:

"Physiology of Grief," by Mantegazza (Ital.); "More Light — Kant and Schopenhauer," by Last (Ger.).

Bibliographical Notices.

JUNE, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for June, 1880, contains: "Considerations of Chemical Philosophy," by F—— and R——; "Sleep and Dreams" (concluded), by Delbœuf.

"A Critique on Kant and Religion," D. Nolen.

"Kant distinguishes two forms of sovereign good—that which is met only in God, and that which the human will seeks to realize as its supreme ideal and consists in the harmonious development of virtue and happiness."

Notes and Discussions:

"Is the Actual Infinite contradictory?" Answer to M. H. Lotze, by Ch. Renouvier.

Renouvier chiefly repeats his arguments as misunderstood by M. Lotze, as he believes.

Books examined are:

"The Religion of the Future," by T. Mamiani; "Illusory Movements," by Dr. Hoppe;

"On the Physiology of Writing," by C. Vogt.

Bibliographical Notices.

JULY, 1880:

The July number of "La Revue Philosophique" for 1880 contains: "Introduction to the Study of Natural Law," by E. Beaussire.

The hypothesis of a state of nature previous to the social state has served as a point of departure for the science of natural law, but has no historic or philosophic foundation, and gives an idea of anarchy. Nature has its real place, and the only mistake is in separating it from the social state. The writer considers natural law in its position among sciences, and gives a detailed account of the history of justice.

"The Theory of Wundt's Knowledge," by H. Lachellier.

Wundt is the Professor Ordinary of Philosophy at Leipzig, and is much occupied in physiological psychology. Lachellier, in this article, makes a scientific study of his principles and his theory of knowledge. "Wundt," he says, "praises Schopenhauer for having taken for a point of departure in his philosophy the logical principle of Reason which dominates all human knowledge.

"Personality," by F. Paulhan.

This subject is considered from the standpoint of a spiritualist, and the views of various writers are compared.

Notes and Discussions:

"Historical and Geographical Determinism," by E. Lavisse.

Books examined are:

"Moral Solidarity," by H. Marion; "The Origin of Language," by Zaborowski (Fr.); "The Characteristics of the Philosophy of the Present in Germany," by Benno Erdmann (Germ.); "The Science of Education," by P. Siciliani (Ital.).

AUGUST, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for August, 1880, contains: "Physiological Localizations, from the Subjective and Critical Point of View," by A. Debon.

This article is a discussion on the relation between the mind and physical sensations.

"Belief and Desire, the Possibility of their Measurement," by G. Tarde.

The author bases his arguments on the question whether psychological quantities can be measured.

"General Disorders of Memory," by Th. Ribot.

This subject is considered as to the peculiarities of disease, and many cases are given as examples.

Books examined are :

"Studies on the History of German Esthetics," since Kant, by Neudecker (Germ.); "On the Association of Ideas," by W. James (Eng.).

Intelligent criticisms on the articles in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," "Mind," conclude this number.

SEPTEMBER, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for September, 1880, contains: "The Theory of the Comical in German Esthetics," by Ch. Bernard.

Very little attention has been given this subject by philosophers until Meier, Eberhard, Mendelsohn, and Sulzer, who have described it in every form with *finesse* and sagacity. "The risible," says Mendelsohn, "is a contrast of perfections and imperfections." The science is making progress, but is as yet in the state of mere assertions not grouped or combined. Lessing has made the boldest strides in his definition, where he establishes a point of approach between the risible and ugly; he admits ugliness in art as a necessity to produce mixed sensations, the terrible and risible. The author specifies the various elements of the comical, and what is lacking in the conception of it by numerous writers.

"Belief and Desire, the Possibility of their Measurement," by G. Tarde, is concluded.

Notes and Documents :

"The Fusion of Similar Sensations," by A. Binet.

The author gives a great variety of mental and physical sensations in examples for comparison.

"Observations on Animal Psychology," by D. Delaunay.

The author does not ascribe moral qualities to dogs, but discovers in them attention and impressions; a young dog is more governed by them than an old one which has acquired experience and intellectual qualities transmitted by inheritance. His observation on animals and their peculiarities are generally just.

Books examined are :

"Darwinism, the Sign of the Present Time," by Wigand (Fr.); "Antitheistic Theories," Robert Flint; "Invention in the Arts, in Sciences, and the Practice of Virtue," E. Joyau.

OCTOBER, 1880.

"La Revue Philosophique" for October, 1880, contains: "Somnambulism questioned," by Ch. Richet.

There is a great difference between somnambulists, but the state of somnambulism is the same with all; it can be characterized in one word—*automatism*. The writer refers the reader to the words of Hamlet as an analysis of somnambulism.

"An English Idealist in the Eighteenth Century, Arthur Collier," by G. Lyon.

This article comprises a personal sketch and a philosophical review of Collier as an idealist, scientist, and a man of piety.

"The Pessimism of Leopardi," by Krantz.

The fixed idea which prevails in pessimist systems gives them a deceptive appearance of strength and simplicity, according to this author, who contends that pessimism is some improvement on optimism, which says all is for the best, not that all is well; pes-

simism is more radical. The poet, being more accessible than a philosopher like Schopenhauer, enables one to see the weak side of this subject.

Varieties:

"The New Programme of Philosophy," by H. Marion.

This programme has been revised, and the most important improvement is found in the following note: The order adopted in this programme should not restrain the liberty of the professor, provided the questions pointed out are all treated, which means that any professor, master of his material and sure of himself, can manage his course as seems most logical to him.

Books examined are:

"The Psychological Doctrine of Association," by Luigi Ferri (Fr.); "Psychology of Sensibility in its History and Foundation," by Nicolas Grote; "Studies on the Manuscript of Pierre de Fermat," by C. Henry.

NOVEMBER, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for November, 1880, contains: "Political Institutions—Preliminaries," by Herbert Spencer; "Somnambulism questioned," by Ch. Richet (concluded); "Partial Disorders of the Memory," by Th. Ribot; and "Platonic Education," by P. Tannery.

In the latter article the author essays to show the importance to science of the ideas of Plato and what influence he has exerted upon the mathematical movement of his century, and among the beliefs of Plato as to education is the one of great interest to-day, that girls should receive the same education as boys, only that they should be educated apart.

Books examined are:

"Moral Certainty," by Ollé-Laprune; "History of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century," by Ferraz (Fr.).

DECEMBER, 1880:

"La Revue Philosophique" for December, 1880, contains: "The Method and Universal Mathematics of Descartes," by L. Liard. "Descartes's doctrines," says the writer, "have been the soul of all the sciences in the seventeenth century, and have remained in part the soul of contemporary sciences." The discussion of his method is complete and interesting.

"Madness in the Child," by G. Compayré.

Many samples of moral as well as mental insanity are herein given, and the ages at which it develops and the causes.

"Political Organization in general," by Herbert Spencer.

Notes and Discussions:

"On the Fusion of Similar Sensations," by J. Delbœuf.

Books examined:

"From Magdeburg to Königsberg." An interesting sketch of Karl Rosenkranz by the author prefaces this article.

Bibliographical Notices:

"On Intuition in Discoveries and Inventions," by Dr. Netter; A. Poey on "M. Littré, and A. Comté"; Coste on "God and the Soul," an Essay on Experimental Idealism; "Elements of Philosophy," by Th. Bernard (Fr.); "Pictures and Resemblances in Philosophy," by R. Eucken; "The Order of Succession in Platonic Dialogues," by Frohmüller; "Lessing's Nathan, a Brochure," by Bloch (Germ.); "Moral Doctrines in Relation to Reality," by Sergi. "Psychological Evolution," E. J. Varona (Ital.).

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

I. GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.¹

Four volumes of this series have already appeared, and each one of them is an important contribution to philosophic literature. Before proceeding to examine the merits of these works separately, a few words ought to be said concerning the general purpose of the series. It is characteristic of Americans to desire to gather to themselves and assimilate results from every quarter and of all descriptions. But it has been questioned if their avidity would not meet with a serious check when they should be brought face to face with the details of German metaphysics. Judging from the present series, this does not appear to have been the case. It indicates that the promoters of the undertaking believe that the time has come to have these very details made accessible to the general reading public. The series comes at a period when scientific activity is at its height, and when very few people are confident enough even to pretend that they know what philosophy is. In the presence of these facts, also, its projectors betray no misgivings as to the requirement of the public for such a labor, and we have to inquire whether they have reckoned wisely in this matter.

We shall be helped in our estimate by reference to the prospectus, in which the editor of the series has defined its scope and intention. It is there stated that the aim of each volume "will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed corrective, of British speculation."

The general object of the series, as a whole, is "to render reasonably accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philosophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more comprehensive studies in the same direction."

We find the justification for a work of this nature in several important considerations, one or two of which only can be alluded to here. At all times the distinctively human needs remain the same, and they are always pressing. Certain questions face every man more or less persistently, and he cannot wait for future generations to pass a verdict upon them. If he consents to live at all he must define his own relation to them. Wisdom plainly demands that he shall bring to his aid the best light that has yet been shed upon these subjects; and the Germans have surely said much about them that no man can afford to pass by slightly.

Philosophy is valuable, however, only as it is, in a way, the product of each man's own thought and life activity. Moreover, these forms of activity are constantly unfolding themselves. An adequate philosophy will recognize both the new and old. In its form of statement emphasis will be laid upon different points in different periods. Hence the need of a continual restatement of the old problems, and of their solution, and the need among different peoples of such a treatment of these problems as shall meet their own particular requirements. In other words, they must have a philosophy of their own, in the sense of dealing, from their own point of view and in an original manner, with the universal problems of philosophy.

But we fail utterly to comprehend the situation if we suppose that any age can build its philosophy entirely anew. The old problems remain, and every step of thought

¹ Published by Messrs. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

progress is conditioned upon what has already been done. Those who deprecate the detailed study of German philosophy lose sight of this fact. They would virtually ignore one of the most important phases of thought that the world has known. Of course this omission is impossible. The essential results of German thinking on this subject must become a part of the intellectual fibre of all who deal with these questions before any noteworthy progress in philosophy can be made. To this end the series under consideration looks, and it will be, when completed, the most important contribution that has yet been made toward its realization.

Mention should be made of the editorship of the series. Great credit is certainly due to Prof. Morris for having undertaken so large a task, and he is to be especially congratulated upon having secured the co-operation of so many eminent philosophical writers. The editor has himself contributed one volume already, and it is to be hoped that others will follow from his pen.

II. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. By GEORGE S. MORRIS, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Michigan University.

All students of Kant are aware of the conflicting lines of thought which meet in the first of his "Critiques." The old philosophical method, which his work did so much to supersede, was the one in which Kant grew up, and he did not wholly rid himself of its preconceptions. His work was essentially a "voyage of discovery," and for this reason, "as the inquiry proceeds, words and phrases acquire, and have attached to them, new meanings." In the midst of these difficulties, to set forth Kant's meaning in a satisfactory manner requires skilful treatment. The old metaphysical point of view, that occupied by Kant at the beginning of his philosophical endeavors, must be made clear, together with the influence exercised by these early opinions on his subsequent thought. We want an exposition, moreover, of Kant's own results, precisely as he stated them, and, in connection with this, an explanation of what is implied in his premises when freed from extraneous conceptions, or, in other words, of the logical outcome of his system, when rigorously developed according to its essential spirit. All this is admirably done in the work before us. The writer's exposition of Kant's thought is clear and vigorous, and he brings to his aid an intimate acquaintance with the later phases of the movement which Kant originated.

The introduction contains a brief examination of the theory of knowledge, which Kant so energetically attacked. According to this view, knowledge is a mechanical process. Subject and object are opposed to, and outside of, each other, and are related after the manner of two physical objects. To explain how the object comes to be taken up into the opposed subject and known is more than any philosopher of mechanism or sensationalism has been able satisfactorily to do.

At each stage of the progress of the work, Kant's repeated limitations of the application of his own argument are considered, and the arbitrariness of these limitations is pointed out. A good example of this treatment is to be found in the chapter on "The Non-contingent Form of Sense." After proving to his own satisfaction the ideal nature of space and time, Kant goes on to caution the reader against the inference that space and time are therefore real in the noumenal sense. His proof has been that they are not entities, things apart from the mind, but forms of human consciousness. He now declares that they are "exclusively subjective," that "they correspond to nothing which is contained in the real nature, whether of the absolute subject or of the absolute object." They have no "absolute objective validity." This assertion Prof. Morris shows to be

purely dogmatic, and points out that Kant is led to it by having here adopted, as his conception of the absolutely real, the conception of "thing," or "substance," in its mechanical meaning. Of course, if "the notion of dead, inert, opaque substance is the synonym of absolute reality," space and time as forms of the mind cannot partake of absolute reality. But the "Critique" again and again shows that this "conception of substance or thing is relative and not absolute." And Prof. Morris concludes that, if, as Kant demonstrates, "the conception of substance, or 'subsistence,' is applicable only to phenomenal—not to absolute—existence, and if the relation of 'inherence' is a purely phenomenal relation, then the proof that space and time neither fall under this conception nor exhibit the mentioned relation is surely no proof that they, too, are purely phenomenal!"

An important chapter is that on "The Limit of Science." In this the vexed questions of the nature of *phenomena* and *noumena*, and of the "thing-in-itself," are discussed. Upon these points, as every one knows, Kant himself is neither clear nor consistent. The various positions occupied by him from time to time are reviewed, with the conclusion that his confused treatment only serves to teach again "the untenableness of all ontological theories, which are colored by materialism," and "the truth of philosophy's universal doctrine concerning the exclusive primacy of spirit in the world of absolute reality." Kant's cardinal error at this point consists, according to the author, in making the distinction between phenomena and noumena, or things-in-themselves, rest on a distinction *without* our knowledge, or possible experience. A more complete philosophy sees that this distinction is one made *within* consciousness, and resting in the very nature of the knowing process.

Prof. Morris does not agree with Kant as to the "futility of metaphysics," provided the term metaphysics be taken in a rational sense. In speaking of the demonstrability of God's existence he says: "'Demonstrable' means 'capable of being shown,' or 'immediately pointed out'; and, in the way just described [*i. e.*, the making explicit of that which is implicit in the living experience of the human 'spirit'], God, as a spirit, comes to be recognized as the present and immediate, universal, living and *demonstrable* precondition and goal of all our life and all our consciousness, be the object of the latter ostensibly man, God, or world."

From the beginning the author makes his own position perfectly clear. Indeed, we count it one of the leading merits of the book that it is written with the energy of conviction. In this non-committal and balancing time it is a pleasure, both to the believer and to the unbeliever, to meet with a vigorous affirmation now and then. Prof. Morris's affirmation takes the form of a defence of the position that we can penetrate in knowledge to reality; that a true science of knowledge furnishes a key to those great secrets of the universe which most vitally concern man, because such a science is a science of being or reality; and that we learn from this science that the universe is not, in its ultimate essence, mechanical, but spiritual.

As a concise statement and criticism of Kant's thought, this little book is invaluable.

III. FICHTE'S SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT, D. D., of Harvard University.

It is not a difficult matter to give, in a brief chapter or two, the general results of Fichte's philosophizing, and to define his place among the thinkers of his time. It is quite another thing, however, to follow his reasonings, step by step, through the elaborate and often apparently fanciful deductions, and to make them comprehensible and

even attractive to ordinary thought. Dr. Everett has undertaken the latter task, and is deserving of the highest commendation for the remarkable manner in which he has carried it through. We rank his book without hesitation among the very first of its kind.

It has been said by a writer on Fichte that "his work is as arid and forbidding as the desert of Sahara. It is a *tour de force* of abstruse and repulsive metaphysics." Certainly, to one who is new to this order of conceptions, there is an air of strangeness and unreality about Fichte's whole procedure, while the relation of his thought to the familiar problems of philosophy is continually obscured by the rigorously technical nature of his various expositions, from which he seldom departs.

Dr. Everett's method of dealing with these difficulties is well chosen. Believing that "no system can be understood until belief in it is seen to be possible," he seeks to identify himself with Fichte's work, and "to make its reasonings seem conclusive where that is possible, and plausible where plausibility is all that can be hoped." In conformity with this purpose we find him, in addition to the continuous unfoldment of Fichte's thought, pausing frequently to sum up results, and to translate them into the language of common use and specify their bearing upon familiar philosophical problems. It becomes necessary, moreover, if Fichte is to be fairly represented in modern dress, to consider, to some extent, the objections raised against him by critics of his own and a later day, as well as the positive teachings of philosophers antagonistic to him. In this way, as occasion requires, we are brought into contact with some of the doctrines of Hume, Schopenhauer, Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, and others, on various fundamental points, and we are made to feel whatever of force there may be in Fichte's position by contrast with theirs.

An adequate treatment of Fichte requires continual reference to Kant, and a comparison of doctrines. But the author is careful to remark that the main justification for examining the relation between the two is to discover the signification of the problems, considered in themselves. What is said in this connection bears so aptly upon the antiquarian spirit which many bring to the study of philosophy that it deserves citation at length. "Indeed," he says, "the study of the history of philosophy fails of its true end when it is pursued merely as a matter of historical or curious interest. One might as well watch the changing forms in the kaleidoscope, or the shifting shadows of interlacing branches, as to study the changing forms of human thought, considered simply as changing forms. For one who feels no need of an answer to the questions with which a system of philosophy deals, that system has no significance." It is the "permanent human interest which is involved in the problems which Fichte undertakes to solve" that is sought in the work before us.

Kant left many unsolved problems, but he also left a method for their solution. Upon these problems Fichte projected his full force, divesting himself of all preliminary explanation. The categories had been taken up bodily into Kant's system, without deduction from any common unifying principle; the thing-in-itself was unexplained; there were many questions arising out of Kant's use of the Practical Reason; and, finally, his system was completely wanting in unity. All these deficiencies Fichte attempted to supply. The I is the unifying principle sought; the categories, and forms of perception, and mental faculties, are deducible from it, and, as there is nothing beyond and without it, the phantom *thing-in-itself* vanishes. Moreover, Fichte undertakes to overcome the externality and arbitrariness with which Kant had invested his postulates, by deriving them from the nature and essence of the I, and not merely assuming them, as Kant had done, to satisfy the needs of the individual.

Now, if we follow Fichte, somewhat into details, his parallelism with Kant, together with the extent of his solution of the problems which baffled the latter, becomes manifest. The difficult point for Idealism, which acknowledges only spiritual activity, is to explain the external world. With Fichte this difficulty appears in the antinomy of the not-me. It is possible to prove that I do not, and cannot, transcend my own consciousness. What we call the external world lies, therefore, within this world of consciousness. On the other hand, all proof avails nothing, for the "world of objects remains to me a world that is foreign to myself." As Dr. Everett further expresses it, "If these objects are outside of my consciousness, how did they ever get into it? or, if they are in my consciousness, how did they ever get out of it?" Idealism requires that the absoluteness and independence of the I be preserved; but this is only accomplished when the I, by its own activity, and without the aid of any foreign element, produces the world of objects.

Fichte finds no theoretical solution for the contradiction here involved. The nearest approach to a solution only reduces the difficulty to its lowest terms, and is as follows: The not-me is found to be, as required, the result of the activity of the I, and not something lying outside of it. But this not-me is produced because the activity of the I is reversed, or thrown back upon itself. The occasion of this reversal is an obstacle with which the activity of the I collides. This obstacle is not, however, the not-me—the latter being produced, as already stated, by the reversed activity of the I. The nature of the obstacle is that of a mere limit.

The antinomy still remains, for even this faint limitation of the I destroys its absoluteness.

Stated in a slightly different form, the nature of the above contradiction reveals itself even more clearly. Intelligence implies limit, and limit implies finiteness. Thus we have the finite I, which is intelligent. But the I as practical has no limitations. It passes into the infinite. The result is that the infinite I and the finite I stand opposed to each other. "The one will assert itself, and will therefore be absolute. The other will be intelligent and self-conscious, and must therefore be limited. . . . Both of these elements belong to the nature of the I." Briefly, then, the antinomy is this: "The I is both infinite and finite," and the problem is to reconcile these opposing elements. Having failed theoretically, Fichte falls back upon a practical solution. It is true that the Ego is compelled to recognize a limit, and is therefore finite; but it is not constrained as to the place of the limit, and may vary it at will. In this respect it is therefore unlimited and infinite. The I, as practical, may continually remove this limit farther and farther into its own infinitude. Although the bounds of the finite can never be overstepped, this possibility of constant approach to the infinite confers upon the Ego the character of infinitude. "The reconciliation," says Dr. Everett, "is found in the fact that, while the limitation must be assumed by and for the sake of the intelligence, as a reality, absolute freedom from limit exists as a postulate. The postulate is always accomplishing itself, though it is never accomplished."

Fichte's similarity to Kant in the above reasoning is obvious. The antinomies of the latter rest upon the opposition of the understanding and the reason; that of the former depends upon the irreconcilability of two similar elements, the theoretical and practical reason, as expressed in the two phases of the Ego already considered. In the systems of each a practical solution is found for the difficulties which the theoretical reason cannot solve. But Fichte's system is the more adequate and complete. By substituting for the practical reason of Kant his own infinitely striving Ego, the postulates are capable

of a more natural explanation. For example, immortality is implied in the inherent striving of the I to realize itself, which requires an eternity for its fulfilment. The starting-point of Fichte sheds light upon the advance achieved by him. In the "Critique of Judgment" Kant suggests that there may be some principle of unity—the supernatural he calls it—in which the antagonistic theoretical and practical reasons are reconciled to each other. This principle Fichte set himself expressly to discover, and he found it in the Ego. It is in this manner that he claims to have established philosophic unity of principle.

We have given a brief outline of Fichte's general procedure, as unfolded by Dr. Everett, but enough, perhaps, to show the manner in which the subject is handled. Some mention ought to be made, in closing, of the literary merits of the book. It is rich in apt illustrations which make one at times almost forget that the author is engaged upon the most difficult philosophical problems.—M. I. SWIFT.

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